Abstract: This study analyzes the geographic spread of commercial Internet Service Providers (ISPs), the leading suppliers of Internet access. The geographic spread of ISPs is a key consideration in U.S. policy for universal access. We examine the Fall of 1998, a time of minimal government subsidy, when inexpensive access was synonymous with a local telephone call to an ISP. Population size and location in a metropolitan statistical area were the single most important determinants of entry, but their effects on national, regional and local firms differed, especially on the margin. The thresholds for entry were remarkably low for local firms. Universal service in less densely-populated areas was largely a function of investment decisions by ISPs with local focus. There was little trace of the early imprint of government subsidies for Internet access at major U.S. universities.
I. Overview
Through a series of decisions in the 1980s and early 90s, policy makers in the Department of Defense and the National Science Foundation (NSF) decided to privatize investment for Internet infrastructure, effectively commercializing the Internet. For most of the 1990s, the Internet developed through largely private, uncoordinated, and market-oriented investment. 1 Enough time has now passed to understand what transpired after privatization. In this paper we analyze an unintended outcome: commercial Internet access firms in the U.S.
almost achieved a public policy ideal, universal geographic coverage.
This study analyzes the factors behind the geographic spread of commercial Internet
Service Providers (ISPs), the leading suppliers of Internet access. The geographic spread of ISPs was, and still is, a key consideration in U.S. policy for universal access. While all consumers had access to the Internet at some price, the key questions for public policy concerned the conditions of small and medium adopters, who care about inexpensively acquiring access. 2 In the 1990s inexpensive was synonymous with a local telephone call to an ISP. Hence, the number of commercial ISPs accessible via a local phone call determined whether a competitive, commercial
Internet was readily available to a community.
We highlight the economic conditions that shaped supply conditions, focusing on two questions: What conditions created highly competitive areas or less-competitive ones? And what factors contributed to variations in the location choices of different types of providers? While the questions are conceptually straightforward, they have received almost no attention. This is symptomatic of how little is known about this important and rapidly growing market. In the year 1 These policies are well known. For summaries, see Werbach [43] , Greenstein [22] , Cannon [4] , and Mowery and
Simcoe [31] . 2 This theme resonates throughout the literature. See e.g., Cherry and Wildman [6] , Compaine and Weinraub [8] ,
Compaine [9] , Drake [13] , Garcia [16] , Garcia and Gorenflo [17] , Kalil [26] , National Academy of Engineering [32] , National Research Council [33] , Strover [39] , Strover, Oden and Inagaki [40] , or Werbach [45] .
we examine it was a $10.8 Billion market. 3 Answering these questions will help clarify why this new service spread as rapidly as it did, and, in particular, how different circumstances shaped the nature of entry in dense and less-dense locations.
We measure economic determinants of ISP availability. We construct and analyze a comprehensive measure of the number of suppliers for every county in the U.S. More specifically, we characterize the determinants of the location of over 60,000 dial-up access points (i.e., "points of presence" or POPs in industry parlance) offered by commercial ISPs in the Fall of 1998 in every county in the United States. While our econometric model is necessarily reduced-form, we can use it to quantify the relative importance of several factors that influenced the dispersion of internet access: economies of scale, pre-existing demographic features of an area, pre-existing infrastructure, and spillovers from universities.
Fall of 1998 was a good time for analyzing the determinants of the geographic coverage of ISPs. By this point, the industry's structure was no longer changing every month. Most of the leading firms had been in the ISP market for a few years, making it possible to document their strategies, behavior, and commercial achievement. In previous research (Downes and Greenstein [12] ) we showed that the US market can be analyzed as thousands of local markets. These markets consisted of small, geographically dispersed local providers for Internet access. In addition, a number of national firms provided access over extremely wide and geographically dispersed areas. In this paper we focus on using a straightforward econometric methodology to improve our understanding of the positive economics behind this observed outcome, namely, how variation in economic factors produced different competitive conditions.
Our key findings are:
-The determinants of ISP entry differed between counties located in an MSA (urban counties) and counties outside of an MSA (rural counties).
-In rural counties, population was the single most important determinant of entry. In urban counties, population mattered, but its effect was small. Further, the impact of population on national, regional and local firms differed, especially on the margin.
The thresholds for entry were remarkably low for local firms.
-Universal service in less densely-populated areas was largely a function of investment decisions by ISPs with local focus. National firms did not play a significant role in bringing access to the U.S. population in less densely-populated areas. If national and local firms differed in the quality of services provided, then marginal adopters experienced differentials in access.
-In urban counties, other important attractors for ISPs included the demographic make-up of a residential and business population and the pre-existing infrastructure of the area. The impact of these differed between national and local firms.
-By 1998, there was still a small trace of the early imprint of the government subsidies for Internet access at major U.S. universities. However, the early growth of
ISPs largely diminished the importance of the presence of a research university.
There was also a small effect from the presence of nearby infrastructure that lowered the costs of opening a small ISP, such as highways and rail lines, along which backbone was laid.
Throughout the paper, we are careful to distinguish between the factors that are quasipermanent, such as the geographic patterns of density, and those that are idiosyncratic to this technology, such as the identities of suppliers. We try to determine if the quasi-permanent or idiosyncratic factors helped achieve near-universal geographic access with very little government involvement. This distinction continues to elicit interest. The targeting of subsidies, if any, depends critically on understanding when privately funded access services achieve nearuniversal geographic access and when they do not.
More recent research continues to find select patterns of demographic and geographic inertia in the deployment and use of Internet access technologies, even among recent access technologies such as broadband over cable modem service or DSL over telephone lines (Grubesic [24] , Flamm [15] , Hu and Prieger, [25] ). The same people in the same places -for example, in the Appalachian region -continue to face problematic circumstances with regard to the supply of access (Strover [40] ). Dial-up ISP service was the first example of an Internet technology to manifest this type of pattern. As of this writing, it still is the access mode of last resort for isolated locations or areas of low density. Hence, understanding the cause of this historical pattern provides a useful perspective on similar patterns today.
The remainder of this paper begins with some background about ISPs. In the section that follows, we state several open research questions. The fourth section of the paper provides a description of the econometric model; the data are described in the fifth and sixth sections. In
the seventh section, we analyze the estimates, and we close the paper with a discussion of the implications of our results.
II. ISPs and Geographic Coverage
We focus on firms that provided dial-up service which enabled a user to employ an Internet browser. Browser development occurred well before we examine this market, at about the same time as the final implementation of policies by the NSF to commercialize the Internet and at the same time as the widespread adoption and development of WWW (World-Wide Web)
technology. Furthermore, we make no distinction between firms that began as on-line information providers, computer companies, telecommunications carriers, or entrepreneurial ventures. As long as a firm provided commercial Internet access as a backbone or a downstream provider, this firm is an ISP in our study.
The presence of ISPs within a local call area determined a user's access to inexpensive
Internet service. The cost of this phone call depended on state regulations defining the size of the local calling area, as well as both state and federal regulations defining the costs of long-distance calling (Nicholas [37] ). Non-toll local areas were typically between ten and twenty miles, depending on state-specific policies for urban and rural charges. Consequently, from a user's perspective, the market structure for low-cost access was defined over a small geographic region.
The number of ISPs in the geographic region in which non-toll calls could be made determined the density of supply of low-cost access to Internet services within any given small geographic region.
The geographic reach and coverage of an ISP is best understood as one of several important dimensions of firm strategy. Geographic coverage was determined in conjunction with choices for value-added services, scale, performance and price. More to the point, ISPs displayed much heterogeneity in their underlying capital and equipment structures, indicative of experimentation in these investments and organizations. 4 ISPs made strategic choices regarding the scale of service, the quality of the hardware and software associated with offering connections, the value-added services to offer in conjunction with access, the geographic scope of the enterprise, and the pricing of product lines. Not surprisingly, ISPs also made different choices about the sizes and features of areas to cover.
A local, independent ISP required a modem farm, one or more servers to handle registering and other traffic functions, and a connection to the Internet backbone. 5 Higherquality components were optional, but were essential for serving most business customers.
High-speed connections to the backbone were expensive, as were fast modems. Facilities needed to be monitored, either remotely or in person, by an employee or ISP owner/operator.
Local telephone firms had some options to use their existing capital and configure their network architecture to receive and carry calls. Additional services, such as web-hosting and network maintenance for businesses, were also costly. All these decisions influenced the quality of the service the customers' experienced, ultimately influencing the revenues and profitability of the business (Maloff [29] ).
National ISPs also differed in their choices of target customer and target area for service.
Some targeted only business users, providing them with value-added services such as web hosting. In this business model, dial-up access might have been a necessary complement to the other, more profitable services offered. Other national ISPs focused on residential customers and on a different set of value-added services, such as appropriate chat rooms or an array of easy-touse bulletin boards. Still others seemed to do a bit of everything, targeting both business and residential use. Substantial price variation survived in this market, depending on the value-added services offered in conjunction with dial-up service and on other factors associated with degrees of differentiation.
These different strategies influenced the geographic focus of providers. ISPs who sought to provide national service tended to maintain points of presence (POPs) in all large and many moderately-sized cities in the U.S., covering a high fraction of the population and potential travel destinations. Some local ISPs targeted niche markets in urban areas that the national ISPs failed to address, seeking to attract those users requiring a "local" component or customized technical service. National firms potentially brought with them the same capabilities in all localities.
Local firms were dependent on various local characteristics such as labor markets, the quality of existing infrastructure and educational institutions, and the initiative of stake-holders in the community. Local firms had the potential advantage, however, of being able to tailor their services to local demand. Thus, our expectation was that, while population and presence in an urban area would be the principal determinants of the location pattern of national ISPs, variation in local conditions would explain much more of the variation in the location of local ISPs.
III. Research Questions
We are hesitant to presume very much about the specific features of firm behavior and market equilibrium in a young market, particularly for purposes of estimating firm entry and exit.
Rather, we borrow from the spirit of the economics literature on firm entry, as applied in many other markets for local services (e.g., Bresnahan and Reiss [2] , Downes and Greenstein [11] Second, we describe the factors that contribute to variations in the entry behavior of different types of providers. We do this because we expect these firms to be responsive to different economic incentives and to offer different services. We hypothesize that this will help clarify how these differences shaped the nature of entry in less-dense circumstances.
We consider several theories about determinants of supply:
Economics of scale and presence in an MSA: Network-access providers grew by adding POPs. A sufficient amount of revenue must justify expending the costs of maintaining the POP. Hence, we expect small populations to support fewer POPs. We expect higher population densities, which were prevalent in urban areas, to be easier to serve.
Pre-existing investment and demand: By 1998, personal computers could be found in 42.1% of U.S. households. In 26.2% of households, at least one member of the household used the Internet at home (Newburger [36] ). Households with computers tended to have higher incomes, to have heads who were better educated, and to be non-minority. 6 We expect such demographic features to have influenced the presence of Internet suppliers. The imprint of the origins of the Internet: The presence of a nearby university might have influenced the demand for Internet service, because universities acted as substitute suppliers for some potential users. In addition, universities were also an important source of potential supply of entrepreneurs to start businesses that supplied Internet access. The first factor would lower demand for commercial services while the second one would decrease the costs of supply, so we have no clear prediction about how these origins for the Internet continued to influence the geographic dispersion of entrants a few years into commercialization.
State regulation: States differed in their regulations for interconnection and local calling plans. Though the 1996 Telecommunications Act standardized some of these rules across localities, there were still significant differences as of 1998. While it is difficult to measure directly the influence of these regulatory factors, they may influence many of the locations in the 6 See e.g., Kridel et al. [27] , Goolsbee and Klenow [19] , National Telecommunications Information Administration [34] , [35] , and Fairlee [14] .
same state. Thus, we utilize state-specific effects to control for variation in the effects of state regulation.
IV. Modeling Approach
We assume that the entrepreneurs who contemplated forming ISPs came from two groups, either the national firms who were developing POPs in many locales supporting national ISP brands or from a set of local individuals directly interested in providing Internet access to a local area. In each period the number of observed entrants (or successful entrepreneurs) was the sum of many decisions by potential entrants about whether to enter a particular region. In general, we presume little about this decision process. Our working hypothesis is that local economic factors shaped entry.
A precise measure of local competition requires detailed information about which connections between telephone switches are local calls, about the characteristics of the residences/businesses served by each switch, and about the locations of the POPs of every ISP.
This type of data is difficult to assemble at a comprehensive level. Our strategy is to come close by constructing approximate measures of competition from a census about POPs and then matching it to US Census and other data about areas. This will lead to extensive information about how many ISPs provided service in certain sufficiently-small geographic areas. This approximation is adequate to allow us to infer which factors induced or discouraged entry, especially in the less dense locations.
We will infer firm presence from a census of every commercial POP in every county in the U.S. Let i stand for type of ISP (e.g., local, national) in county j. Let N j i be the number of
ISPs of type i in county j.
Let X j be the set of variables describing characteristics of county j that potentially influenced the location pattern of ISPs. These include measures of factors that encouraged supply, such as population levels and density, pre-existing features of demand and local infrastructure, the presence of universities, and state dummies.
Neighboring areas also contributed to potential supply. For example, consumers in county j could get low cost access from a supplier in an urban county next door that had many already-present suppliers. Assume there were H j counties contiguous to county j and let X h , h = 1,2,..., H j , be the set of variables describing characteristics of contiguous county h. These factors should have induced supply in that county, to be sure, and also possibly influenced the behavior of potential suppliers for county j.
We assume the distribution for N j i is Poisson with mean λ j i , which takes the form
Here, X j β i measures the influence of factors within county j, while X h γ i measures the influence of factors within counties surrounding county j. We let d jh be the distance between counties j and h.
We weight by distance as a way of examining directly the geographic scope of the influence of the characteristics of neighboring counties factors. As in Bresnahan and Reiss [2] and Downes and Greenstein [11] , we do not presume to know what neighboring factors were relevant to entrants. This specification permits us measure flexibly and parsimoniously the influence of the characteristics of neighboring counties on the extent of entry in county j. The larger are the α i (the coefficients on distance), the less important were the characteristics of neighboring counties.
If the numbers of ISPs of each type i in county j are independent Poisson random variables, then the log of the likelihood function is:
Minimizing ℓ provides estimates of the parameters in (1) .
If the distribution of the number of entrants has been correctly specified, minimizing (2) generates efficient parameter estimates. Cameron and Trivedi [5] argue that economic data typically violate the restriction implicit in the Poisson that the mean and the variance are equal.
If the data exhibit over-dispersion, estimates generated by minimizing (2) continue to be consistent as long as the mean number of ISPs is correctly specified (Gourieroux, Monfort, and
Troghon [20] ). Appropriate corrections to the standard errors can be made using the formulas for robust standard errors given in Cameron and Trivedi [5] . 7 This method has several strengths. First, the endogenous variables are skewed and nonnegative but most of the observations concentrate at small countable numbers, appropriate for a count data approach such as this. Second, we need a single method to summarize the determinants of observations with small counts (e.g., no or a small number of entrants in most rural counties of the U.S.) and large counts (e.g., major cities). This approach does this quite easily and without excessive sensitivity to the outlying observations. Third, the specification provides a flexible approach for examining the importance of neighboring geographic features, the key measurement issue whenever the geographic scope of the market is difficult to define precisely, ex ante.
In addition, this method allows us to explore the possibility that different types of ISPs had different objectives or that the competitive environment facing national and local firms might have differed. For example, Dinlersoz [10] found that the location pattern of retail alcoholic beverage stores in California was consistent with a dominant firms-competitive fringe model. In the ISP context, such a model might be appropriate for urban markets, where the dominant firms were the national ISPs and the locals formed the competitive fringe. Dinlersoz
An alternative approach is to use an explicit distribution in which the mean and variance are not equal. The most common distribution for this purpose is the negative binomial. If the assumptions underlying the negative binomial specification are valid, a simple test can be implemented to determine if it is appropriate to impose the equality of mean and variance restriction implicit in the Poisson specification. The risk, however, is inconsistent estimates if the negative binomial specification is invalid. Since we have no particular reason to believe the negative binomial specification is more appropriate than other possible distributional assumptions, we have chosen instead to estimate the basic Poisson model and correct the standard errors.
showed that, in the dominant firms-competitive fringe model, there would be differences across firm type in the effects of the determinants of the location pattern.
We test for evidence of differences in the determinants of location patterns by testing the null hypothesis that the β i , α i , and γ i are the same for all types. The test is only suggestive of differences driven by the supply-side of the market; differences in these parameters could result from differences in the effects of demand-side determinants of the location pattern. These sources of data shaped our measurement of competition. As the discussion above of our econometric model makes clear, our dependent variable is the number of suppliers which had POPs in a market. In constructing the dependent variable, we needed to make use of all available information on POP presence, even information from small fringe firms in remote 8 Incomplete historical versions of these lists posted at http://www.archive.org/ provide a sense of the data utilized in this study. Our data set includes POPs found in the ISP section of thedirectory (http://www.thedirectory.org/) in 1998 and excludes POPs found in bulletin boards. Our data set also includes POPs for ISPs listed in the Boardwatch [3] backbone section.
locations. For our research goals the location of these fringe firms was quite important, so we went out of our way to incorporate them into the dataset. 9 So as to lose as few observations as possible, we adopted the following procedures:
When the city of a dial-in phone number was listed by an ISP, we used that to infer the presence of a POP. 10 When it was in doubt, the area code and prefix of the dial-in POP were compared to lists of the locations of local switches with these area-codes and prefixes. Then we used the location of the local switch to infer location. If this failed to locate the POP, which happened for small ISPs that only provided information about their office and nothing about the size of their dial-up network, then the voice dial-in number for the ISP was used as an indicator of location.
11
Finally, to enhance a variety of marketing and performance goals, some ISPs maintained two or more POPs in the same location; in such cases, we counted this as one firm presence.
On final count, the merged set contained over 65,000 phone numbers which served as dial-in POPs. Applying the above procedures resulted in a total of 6,000 ISPs. Of 3,109 counties, over three-quarters were served by four or more firms. Of the total number of ISPs, approximately half were ISPs for which we had only a single indicator of its location.
Strengths and Weaknesses. Our procedure for establishing the location of POPs will produce flawed information about entry only if it generates sampling error which correlates with 9 The lack of a listed phone number, especially for small fringe ISPs, was what limited us from effectively using information about switches and calling areas from commercial firms, such as CCMI. We could have either (1) used information about a place and made an educated guess about the local calling area or (2) used the information about the prefixes and made an educated guess about the county the ISP served. Both procedures would have induced measurement error. We guessed that the first procedure would have induced less error in major urban areas with complex overlapping calling areas, while the second procedures would have induced less error in less dense counties with a non-obvious boundary. In either case, we had to assign a county to every firm because information from other sources comes to us only at the county level, so the latter procedure required us to make the fewest compromises in assembling the rest of the data set and allowed us to correct better for measurement error. Since the major urban areas were all competitive, the benefits of minimizing errors in those areas was small, which, once again, favored the second procedure. 10 When a city is part of two counties and the phone number did not resolve the ambiguity, the phone number was counted as part of the county in which the city has the greatest share of its land. 11 This last procedure mostly resulted in an increase in the number of firms we cover, not a substantial change in the geographic scope of the coverage of ISPs. It did, however, help identify entry of ISPs in a few small rural areas.
geography. We have taken several steps to quantify and, if necessary, correct any biases that the procedure may have imparted. We checked our data against very detailed maps of the U.S. and standard name/places references. 12 We also checked our data against multiple sources. In addition, though we avoided all apparent measurement error, we adopted statistical procedures to correct for any measurement error we may have inadvertently induced. Overall, we found no evidence of any error in the coverage of small commercial ISPs, especially in areas of low density. 13 This approach provides no information about the market shares of suppliers in specific locations, nor about their quality. Since, as we noted above, our data are from a point in time at which significant concentration in supply had not occurred, the absence of information on market share is not problematic. Second, while we cannot measure quality, we are aware of related work that has found some differences in the quality of local, regional, and national firms. 14 By separately examining the location pattern of different types of providers, we can look indirectly at variation in quality.
Our procedure may create the impression that there had been less ISP entry than had actually occurred in new suburbs in counties that bordered on dense, urban counties. New suburbs frequently used the telephone exchange of existing cities. Unless the ISP specifically named this new suburb in the bordering county as a targeted area, our procedures will not count 12 Sometimes an ISP would not provide clear indications about the extent of its coverage. However, in most cases we could infer coverage from other supplemental information. Our largest problems arose in the suburbs of recently growing cities. When these suburbs approached and crossed county boundaries, it became increasing difficult to attribute a supplier to a distinct area with full confidence. In such instances, we normally attributed the ISP to the area with the highest population. Also, some ISPs used common names to refer to their area of coverage, though the common name could literally refer to multiple different places in a region -such as a lake community, forest area, valley settlement or resort/vacation complex. With careful triangulation of several sources of data we could often attribute the ISP to the appropriate area. The default in a handful of instances was to attribute it to the mostpopulated areas. 13 The Foundation for Rural Service publishes membership directories for hundreds of rural cooperative telephone companies. The 1998 directory portrayed fairly widespread support of Internet access by rural telephone firms. Our findings did not qualitatively change when we integrated this information into our database, suggesting that our first two sources were comprehensive. 14 See, e.g., Nicholas [37] , Greenstein [22] , Strover [39] , or Strover, Oden and Nagoki [40] .
the ISP's presence in that new suburb. 15 Our best control for this potential bias is our definition of the market for an ISP as a county and its nearby neighbors. We reaffirmed this decision in retrospect as we took note of a few changes in the market. 16 The implementation of the E-rate program began on a large scale in 1999. This program, along with the AOL-Time Warner merger a year later, altered the expectations for the industry's growth. Hence, in retrospect, we view Spring and Fall 1998 as the closest the ISP industry ever got to a stable equilibrium that occurred with minimal government intervention.
Definitions:
In all tables below, national ISPs are defined as firms that maintain POPs in more than 25 states. Local firms are present in three or fewer counties. We classify the remainder as regional ISPs. 15 A similar and related bias arises when a county's boundaries and a city's boundaries are roughly equivalent, even when the neighboring county contains part of the suburbs of the city. In this situation, many ISPs that serve the neighboring county will be located within the city's boundary. 16 This time period also is coincident with comparative stability in firm strategy. By this time, virtually every firm had implemented flat-rate pricing as one of its options, and sometimes as its only option. In addition, AOL had since recovered from its mismanagement of the introduction of flat-rate pricing. As it turned out, the next (and last) major experiment in business models for dial-up came from the introduction of so-called "free" ISPs, which began in early 1999. Their entry did not alter geographic coverage much because these firms were national in scope and initially made contracts to use existing infrastructure operated by others, the backbone providers covered in this dataset. Their entry had no effect on the geographic footprint of local ISPs in low density areas.
We only examine commercial ISPs, excluding firms such as bulletin boards, the primary business of which was providing downloadable text or software without Internet access. Both thedirectory and Boardwatch tried to distinguish between bulletin boards and ISPs, where the former might have consisted of a server and modems while the latter provided WWW access,
FTP, e-mail, and often much more. 17 Both sources for data eschewed listing university enterprises that acted as ISPs for students and faculty. This is less worrisome than it seems, since commercial ISPs provided over 90 percent of household access in 1998 (Clement [7] , NTIA [34] ). In addition, commercial ISPs gravitated towards the same locations as universities. This study's procedure, therefore, will likely pick up the presence of ISP access at remotely-situated educational institutions unless the amount of traffic outside the university was too small to have induced commercial entry. We also control for the presence of different types of universities, so if different types of universities substituted for commercial firms, our statistical procedures should capture this.
The tables below provide a broad description of county features. Population numbers come from 1998 U.S. Bureau of the Census estimates. We labeled a county as urban when the Census Bureau gave it an MSA designation, which is the broadest indicator of an urban settlement in the region and includes about a quarter of the counties in the United States. The data pertain to all states except Hawaii and Alaska. 18 These data also include the District of Columbia, which is treated as another county. Throughout this study, county definitions correspond to standard U.S. Census county definitions. This results in a total of 3,109 counties. 17 Extensive double-checking verified that thedirectory and Boardwatch were careful about the distinction between an ISP and a bulletin board. No bulletin boards were ISPs, and they were appropriately not classified as an ISP. 18 Alaska and Hawaii are excluded because the geography and related statistics are so unusual. We have, however, estimated the specifications presented below including all usable observations from Alaska and Hawaii. None of the conclusions are changed when these observations are included.
VI The Geographic Scope of ISPs in Fall of 1998
The summary of the nature of ISP coverage can be found in Table 1. This table provides a summary of our endogenous variable. 19 Table 1 is organized by counties in the continental U.S. In calculating these summary statistics, we accounted for the presence of ISPs in nearby counties. 20 Specifically, we used as the unit of observation a county together with all other counties with a geographic center within 30 miles of the geographic center of the central county.
We chose 30 miles to create this market definition because this was within the first mileage band for a long-distance call in most rural areas. 21 See Downes and Greenstein [12] for more detailed discussion of these issues, where we considered a variety of procedures for a sample taken a year earlier and concluded that this procedure was superior.
Of the 3,109 counties, 229 did not contain a single POP supported by any ISP in its county or in any nearby county, 121 had only one, 203 had only two, and 126 had only three.
These counties tended to contain a small part of the population. Just over three percent of the U.S. population lived in counties with three or fewer ISPs nearby. As evidence that low (high) entry was predominantly a rural (urban) phenomenon, almost ninety-seven percent (1,317 out of 1,360) of the counties with ten or fewer suppliers were rural.
In Table 1 , we also indicate which markets were served by only local, regional or national suppliers. The most common occurrence (which was a rural country) was that a market was entirely supplied by local or regional ISPs. Rarely, if ever, were markets with few providers entirely supplied by national ISPs. In fact, of the 3,109 counties in our data set, 1,458 counties 19 For more extensive discussion of the geographic scope of ISP coverage, see Downes and Greenstein [12] . 20 To do this we use the U.S. Bureau of the Census's CONTIGUOUS COUNTY FILE, 1991: UNITED STATES [42] . 21 In Downes and Greenstein [12] , we experimented with a number of different definitions of the market. We began by using the counties themselves as the unit of observation. We found that this definition failed to account for the fact that counties with little entry frequently border on competitive markets. We also tried calculating the influence of all neighboring counties without distinguishing by their distance, but found that this was far too inclusive of neighboring counties, the populations of which could not be linked by local phone calls.
were not within 30 miles of a national provider, 473 were not within 30 miles of a regional provider, and 660 were not within 30 miles of a local ISP.
22 Table 1 also gives information on the types of providers in markets with few entrants. Of the 121 with only one supplier in this county and nearby counties, 49 were served by a local ISP, 68 were served by a regional ISP, and 4 were served by a national ISP. Of the 203 with two suppliers in this county and nearby counties, 72 had only local suppliers, 99 had only regional, and 5 had only national. The predominance of local and regional suppliers in less competitive markets also held in markets with three or four total suppliers. Once the number of entrants got past about five or six in a county and nearby area, then residents likely had a choice from at least one national ISP, as well as additional local and regional suppliers.
The other columns of Table 1 Figure 1 , which shows all the counties with at least one national provider. Counties shaded in black have at least one national provider, and counties shaded in gray have only local or regional providers. The figure shows clearly that national firms were present primarily in the major urban areas. In the areas with the least entry, predominantly rural counties, no national firm had entered.
To characterize the sources of variation in entry across counties, we collected data about the local areas. Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for our econometric model.
Population:
We included measures of the population at the county level, as noted above.
This accounted for economies of scale. We also included a dummy variable for whether a county was designated as part of an urban area, capturing the notion that density alone lowered costs of provision.
Pre-existing demand:
We included measures of the population that correlated with those found in measures of the demand for PCs, which might have induced entry of suppliers in order to meet potential demand or provided potential entrepreneurs for opening ISPs. 23 We included measures of the age and education distributions of the population. To control both for the level and the distribution of income in each county, we included median family income in 1999 as well as the percent of families with incomes under $25,000 and over $75,000.
Recent research, particularly Fairlee [14] , has documented racial/ethnic differences in access to the Internet. Fairlee noted that, even after accounting for differences in income, 23 We also attempted to utilize direct measures of the fraction of the population that adopted PCs. We found that available data (from the CPS supplement) only sufficiently sampled major urban areas, forcing us to exclude too many observations from our analysis.
education, and occupation, large racial/ethnic differences in Internet access remain, conditional on computer ownership. Fairlee went on to argue that, while price differences probably do not explain remaining gaps, racial differences in access to the Internet could. To explore that possibility, we included as controls the percent of each county's population that is AfricanAmerican, Native American, Hispanic, and Asian-American. In addition, given Fairlee's suggestion that occupation could influence demand for Internet access, we included as a control the percent of each county's population employed in occupations classified as professional.
Location communication infrastructure:
We looked at features of the workforce from which ISPs drew their employees so as to examine factors that either raised costs to suppliers or induced entry to meet demand. As a result, we included the percent of the county's workforce employed in professional occupations and the wages for workers in the computer services sector and in the business services sector. Suppression due to privacy restrictions meant that observations on the percent of the workforce employed in professional occupations and on wages were missing for a number of smaller counties. As a result, we also estimated results that excluded the workforce composition and wage variables. 24 Since there should be spillovers from the business computing community in the supply of technical talent, we also constructed a measure of the scale of the business computing community: the number of large-scale computing sites per capita (See Greenstein, Lizardo, Spiller [23] ). We also have dummy variables for whether the primary provider of local voice services was a descendant of the Bell companies or GTE, who were presumed to provide more advanced infrastructure than independent phone companies. This follows other researchers (See Mini [30] , Shampine [39] ). 24 If data on one of the wage variables was missing for a county, that county was excluded from the estimation of any model that included that wage variable.
Finally, conversations with those in the industry suggested that the backbone needed for high-quality communications was more easily routed to communities near major highways and railroad lines, since the necessary cables could be laid along these highways or railroads. To determine if ISP presence was influenced by the pre-existing layout of transportation infrastructure, we used as controls dummy variables that indicate whether a limited access highway or major railroad lines passes through the county. We created these variables from the classification of transportation infrastructure present in the Tiger Line files produced by the U.S.
Census Bureau.
The Imprint of the origins of the Internet: We also constructed measures of total enrollment and enrollment in technical disciplines at local post-secondary institutions. We 25 we present separate estimates for these two sets of counties. In addition to the controls described above, we also included state dummies as controls for variation in state regulatory influences and in other economic determinants that were common across the state. 26 We tested the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the characteristics of the neighboring counties were jointly equal to zero. For the specification implied by first column of Table 4 , the F-statistic corresponding to this null is 152.45, allowing us to reject the hypothesis at the 1 percent level. 27 However, while the characteristics of contiguous counties mattered statistically, the economic importance of these characteristics was negligible. Further, none of the qualitative conclusions concerning the impact of home county characteristics were affected by the inclusion of information on contiguous county. For those reason, we present the more parsimonious models that exclude contiguous county characteristics. 28 In columns 2 and 3 of Table 4 , we present estimates of variants of the model in column 1 in which we limit the sample to urban counties and allow for differences in the equilibrium location pattern of local and national ISPs. 29 In columns 5 and 6 of Table 4 , we present estimates of variants of the model in column 4 in which we limit the sample to rural counties and allow for differences in the equilibrium location pattern of local and national ISPs. Using these 25 For example, the Wald test statistic that corresponds to the null of equality of the coefficients on all variables except for the state dummies in the first and fourth columns of Table 3 took on the value of 243.19. Since there were 24 degrees of freedom, we could reject the null of equality at the 1 percent level. 26 As indicated above, we also estimated models that included percent of the county's workforce employed in professional occupations and the wages for workers in the computer services sector and in the business services sector. None of these additional controls consistently exhibited a significant influence on the mean number of ISPs in a county. Further, the coefficients on the remaining variables changed little when these additional controls were added. Estimates of specifications that include these additional variables are available on request. 27 We were also able to reject the null for the specifications given in columns 2 and 3. 28 Estimates of the parameters of the models that include the contiguous county characteristics are available from the authors. 29 The effects of the determinants of the location pattern of regional providers differed significantly from the impact of the location pattern of both local and national providers. Since, however, the qualitative effects of the determinants were, for the most part, very similar to their effects on the location pattern of local providers, we did not include estimates for the regional providers. These estimates are available from the authors. models, we tested for similarities of coefficients between national and local firms. We easily rejected the hypothesis that they had equal sensitivity to the exogenous variables.
VII. The determinants of geographic presence
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Economics of scale and population density: As is apparent from the estimates in Table   4 , the sharpest difference between urban and rural counties was the sensitivity of the location pattern to population levels. For counties outside of an MSA, population was the major determinant of location. For local ISPs, the elasticity of the mean number of ISPs with respect to population was 0.5344 for a county with the mean population of rural counties. For national ISps, this elasticity was 1.2589.
For urban counties, the total number of ISPs also increased as population increased. This is consistent with the presence of economies of scale at the point of presence. That said, the effect of population was relatively small, once we accounted for the other determinants of ISP location. For example, the estimates of the specification for the total number of ISPs in counties in MSAs indicate that, all else equal, the elasticity of the mean number of ISPs with respect to population was 0.0469 for a county with the mean population. 31 There are interesting differences between local and national ISPs in the elasticity of the mean number of ISPs with respect to population. Despite the fact that few national ISPs located in counties with small populations, for the counties outside of MSAs, this elasticity was twice as large for national firms in comparison to local firms. In rural counties, national firms appear to have been particularly sensitive to population.
For counties in MSAs, we see the opposite; the elasticity with respect to population was almost twice as large for local firms in comparison to national or regional firms. This is 30 The Wald test statistic that corresponds to the null of equality of the coefficients on all variables except for the state dummies in columns 2 and 3 took on the value of 77.03. Since there were 24 degrees of freedom, we could easily reject the null hypothesis at the 1 percent level. 31 Let X j k be the k th element of X j . Then the elasticity of the mean number of ISPs of type i in county j (λ j i ) with respect to X j k is β ik X j k .
consistent with Table 1 , where local firms entered at lower population levels than did national firms.
While at first blush these results seem surprising, they make considerable sense in light of the history of the ISP market and of Bresnahan and Reiss' [2] seminal work on entry in sparsely populated markets. In 1998, ISPs were just beginning to establish their presence in rural areas.
Bresnahan and Reiss also found that marginal firms are particularly sensitive to population. That is just what we see in the rural counties.
In the urban counties, the results of Bresnahan and Reiss [2] are less relevant, because the markets are larger and because firms have more experience in the market. As a result, marginal firms considered factors other than population when making their entry decisions.
In the discussion that follows, our focus will be on the determinants of the location pattern in urban counties, since population is the dominant factor in rural counties. Where it is appropriate, however, we will note where there are sharp differences between urban and rural settings in the determinants of ISP location.
Related differences arose in the implied differences in the typical number of ISPs of each type in the typical urban and rural county. For example, if a county with the mean characteristics of rural counties was reclassified as urban, the number of national ISPs in that county is predicted to increase by 41418.52 percent, on average, which is quite large due to starting from such a low base in rural counties. 32 While this result is consistent with lower costs of provision in areas of higher density, such an explanation for this estimated effect would be consistent with similar responsiveness from local and regional firms, which we did not find. Similar calculations indicate that, if this county with the mean characteristics of rural counties was reclassified as urban, the number of local ISPs is predicted to increase by 64.426 percent, on average. Hence, 32 To produce this result, for each state we calculated the predicted number of ISPs, using the estimates in columns 2 and 5 in Table 4 . We then averaged across states to generate the numbers used to calculate the percentage difference.
we think that this finding arose due to difference in objectives or due to the type of dominant firm-competitive fringe dynamics discussed in Dinlersoz [10] . For example, many national firms provided national service to traveling business customers, so they provided POPs in the urban centers that were the most common travel destinations. Local firms had no motive to open their own facilities outside of their home territories. 33 The importance of presence in an MSA, independent of population, suggest that density may be a critical determinant of entry. We found, however, that there is no relationship between population per square mile and location of any type of ISP. Thus, these results suggest that the presence in an MSA may be accounting for the age of the market. This coincidence may explain the fact that, for counties outside of an MSA, the location pattern of ISPs was strongly related to the presence of college graduates in the population, not to the presence of white collar workers. This is most evident for local ISPs, where the coefficients 33 By this point in the evolution of business practices among ISPs, it was possible for a local firm to arrange to "rent" phone numbers in major cities from other national backbone firms, such as Sprint. With such renting a local ISP could provide its business customers with options when they left their local area (Boardwatch [3] ). 34 The estimated coefficients on our measure of density are likely to provide an imperfect picture of the role of density, since there was significant variation within counties in density. The most likely outcome is that the coefficient on density understates the full impact of density on ISP location. For example, in areas like New York County (Manhattan), certain neighborhoods would have density in excess of the density of the county. If the ISPs in New York County located nearest to these neighborhoods, the role of density could never be estimated using county-level data.
on these variables are nearly equal in magnitude with opposite signs. Taken together, the results in Table 4 indicate that in urban and rural counties, ISPs were more prevalent when the population included higher shares of workers with college degrees and white collar employment.
The coefficient on median family income gives the impact of a $10,000 increase in median family income, holding constant the percent of families in the county who had incomes in the upper and lower tails of the income distribution. In other words, despite the fact that the coefficient on median family income is negative, if one county had a higher median family income and had a larger percentage of families with incomes over $75,000 than did a comparison county, the higher-income county would typically have more ISPs. That conclusion is attributable to the facts that more ISPs were located in counties with higher percentages of families with income above $75,000 and that the coefficient on the percent of families with incomes over $75,000 is relatively larger than the coefficient on median family income. The elasticity of the mean number of ISPs with respect to family income was -3.73, while the elasticity with respect to the percent of families with incomes over $75,000 was 2.47.
The impact of an increase in the percent of families with incomes below $25,000 was generally insignificant. Only for local providers in rural counties was there ever a significant relationship between the number of ISPs and the percent of families with incomes below $25,000. For these providers, an increase in the percent of families in the lower end of the income distribution had an effect in the opposite direction of the effect of an increase in the percent of families in the upper tail. The coefficient on the number of large-scale computer sites per capita indicates that the presence of a technically sophisticated business computing population encouraged entry. In all cases, however, these influences were comparatively small. The coefficient on the regional Bell dummy in column 1 indicates that those counties that had been served by a regional Bell company had 115.72 percent more ISPs than did counties not served by a regional Bell company.
Similarly, the elasticity of the mean number of ISPs with respect to the number of mainframe sites per 100,000 people was 0.2477. The implication is that infrastructure variation would only generate substantive differences in counties where the supply was already low for other reasons.
In counties in MSAs, the presence of highways and rail lines also played an interesting role in fostering entry. The presence of these transportation features had no impact on the geographical dispersion of national ISPs. Significantly more local ISPs were located in counties with limited access highways and with major rail lines, however, consistent with the hypothesis that this pre-existing infrastructure lowered the costs to local firms. For example, counties in which at least one limited access highway was present had 64.69 percent more local ISPs than did counties with no limited access highways, and counties in which at least major rail line was present had 94.27 percent more local ISPs than did counties with no major rail lines. Since these transportation features were nearly ubiquitous in high-density areas, where the national firms predominated, it is not that surprising that the geographic dispersion of the national firms was unrelated to the presence of these features. For counties in an MSA, the limited impact of the presence of Carnegie 1 institutions and the absence of any impact of the presence of Carnegie 2 and 3 institutions run counter to the popular wisdom that diffusion of Internet access was influenced by the presence of access that had been built with federal subsidies. Nonetheless, we do not want to suggest that this popular wisdom is an urban myth. In fact, we think the results for rural counties show that, in the early stages of diffusion of access, complementarities did exist. From the urban results, we infer that commercial firms had largely diffused around the metropolitan areas of the country by 1998, overwhelming the imprint of university subsidies on cross-sectional supply and entry. 35 Further, the negative relationship between a county's Carnegie 1 enrollment and the presence of national ISPs in that county is consistent with the view that the national firms viewed the large research universities that had been primary beneficiaries of federal subsidies as competitors.
State regulation: While states differed in the regulations for interconnection and local calling plans, no measures of these differences in regulation exist. Since we expected regulatory differences to matter, we included state dummies in our specification. We could not, however, disentangle the effects of regulatory differences from other unmeasured factors that were correlated within a state. Hence, the coefficients on our state dummies do not provide much useful information on the causes of these systematic interstate differences.
VIII Discussion
Internet technology incubated under government supervision for over two decades prior to commercialization. This incubation, arguably, made it ripe for immediate use by many vendors (Greenstein [21] , Mowery and Simcoe [30] ). Further, the most common access mode, dial-up Internet services, was a retrofit on top of telephones and required incremental investment by users of personal computers. And, while such technical maturity and complementarity did not guarantee widespread diffusion, this propitious combination of features did enable low-cost 35 While the industry is full of examples of suppliers located next to major universities just as commercialization ensued, commercial entry was so swift and the amount of capital investment so large that any such effect was largely eliminated by the Fall of 1998. private investment and development. Furthermore, at the time of commercialization, the technology was such that there were limited economies of scale for an ISP that operated few POPs. Hence, the presence of access in comparatively small towns, which initially were ignored by national firms, became feasible for local and independent ISPs, who were the dominant providers in such areas (Downes and Greenstein [12] ).
Yet, even with these circumstances there were some places that did not attract much entry. Our estimates indicate that the places that lacked access had features that drove up cost, such as low density, lack of major highway or railway for carrying backbone, and the absence of investments in other IT infrastructure that supported a labor market for technical talent. In addition, extremely unfavorable demographics contributed to lack of demand, which naturally led to less entry.
We think this experience is informative about policies for network development in the absence of government subsidy. Subsidies should not go to areas where private suppliers would amply and competitively supply access services. Our findings would emphasize targeted subsidies to achieve universal service goals in areas that lack encouraging demographics (e.g., age, education or income), have discouraging infrastructure conditions (e.g., lack of major roads or pre-existing labor markets), or possess other cost related disadvantages that could prove impediments to providing Internet access in low density areas.
The differences in the factors influencing the location patterns of local and national ISPs also raise questions about the quality of provision in less-dense areas and about the potential need for government subsidies to insure minimum quality. Our results indicate that local firms were more likely to be located in less populated counties than were their national counterparts.
If local firms did not provide similar products as national firms, then users in less populated areas may have experienced lower quality than that found in urban areas. To be sure, some local ISPs in small towns offered high-quality service, more attention, and product tailored to local needs. But there is mounting evidence that some local suppliers upgraded their equipment more slowly (Augereau and Greenstein [1] ), provided narrower arrays of frontier services (Greenstein, [21] ), and limited their services to only business users (Nicholas [37] ; Strover [40] ).
While dial-up Internet service remains the access mode for less dense locations as of this writing, we caution, however, that three factors may make it inappropriate to extend these lessons from the dial-up era to the broadband era, especially in dense urban areas. Our findings ISPs are less prevalent in the diffusion of broadband technologies. Third, the regulatory setting for dial-up and broadband are quite different. While a full analysis of the differences between each era goes beyond the scope of our study, our study does help clarify why the circumstances of the earlier era favored geographically dispersed infrastructure provided by many nonregulated firms, not just large incumbent regulated firms, the more prominent suppliers of the broadband era. 
